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Abstract 
We use Belgian manufacturing firm-level data over the period 1996- 2007 to analyze the impact of 
imports from different origins on firm growth, exit, and skill upgrading. For this purpose we use both 
industry-level and firm-level imports by country of origin and distinguish between firm-level 
outsourcing of final versus intermediate goods. Results indicate that China is different from both other 
low-wage and OECD countries. Industry-level import competition and firm-level outsourcing to 
China reduce firm employment growth and induce skill upgrading. In contrast, industry-level imports 
have no effect on Belgian firm survival, while firm-level outsourcing of finished goods to China even 
increased firm's probability of survival. In terms of skill upgrading, the effect of Chinese imports is 
large. Import competition from China accounts for 42% (20%) of the within firm increase in the share 
of skilled workers (non-production workers) in Belgian manufacturing over the peri od of our 
analysis, but these effects, as well as the employment reducing effect, remain mainly in low-tech 
industries. Firm-level outsourcing to China further accounts for a small but significant increase in the 
share of non-production workers. This change in employment structure is in line with predictions of 
recent model of trade-induced technological change and offshoring. 
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For many developed countries the past decades has been characterized by large and rising
imports from China, a loss in manufacturing employment, rm exit and oshoring of especially
low skilled jobs to low wage countries. This has triggered a substantial amount of research
both from trade economists and labor economists in search of a causal relationship between
the imports from low wage countries and labor market outcomes in (especially) developed
countries. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to this literature by using rm-level
panel data for Belgium that are highly disaggregate and which includes information on rm-
level imports by source country. The use of this data oers several distinct innovations
compared to the previous literature. First, by using rm-level data we can control for rm
heterogeneity and analyze within industry re-allocation eects which was not possible in
studies using industry-level data. Second, by having access to imports at the rm-level,
we can usefully distinguish between an industry-wide import competition eect and a rm-
specic eect for those rms importing goods directly from low wage countries (outsourcing).
Third, it allows us to distinguish two dierent types of rm-level outsourcing: outsourcing of
intermediate and nished goods.
Our empirical strategy in part follows Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) { henceforth BJS
(2006) { and Biscourp and Kramarz (2007). BJS (2006) study the eects of industry-level
import competition from low wage countries on US manufacturing rms' employment growth
and survival. We perform a similar analysis while introducing within rm skill upgrading
as a new margin of adjustment to foreign competition and focusing on China. Our results
conrm the (modest) negative impact of low-wage countries' import competition on rms'
employment growth and survival while further qualifying China as special with respect to
number of dimensions. Above all, our ndings indicate that import competition from China,
but not from other low-wage countries, is responsible for a large fraction of the observed
skill upgrading in Belgian manufacturing. Indeed, Rodrik (2006) and Schott (2008) already
pointed out that Chinese exports have dierent characteristics with respect to other low-wage
countries, i.e., they are more sophisticated and show more overlap with products of OECD
countries.
2Concerning our analysis of rm-level outsourcing, previous industry level studies1 did not
allow researchers to: (i) control for rm heterogeneity; (ii) distinguish within rm adjustment
from between rm adjustment; (iii) take into account the dierent eect of international
sourcing depending on the nal vs intermediate nature of the imported goods. One notable
exception is Biscourp and Kramarz (2007). Similar to them we use rm-level imports and
distinguish between outsourcing of intermediate goods and of nal goods by countries of origin.
Dierent to their study, we address the endogeneity problem inherent in the use of rm-level
imports by adopting an IV strategy and exploiting product-country level taris and trade
weighted exchange rates.
While we look at several rm performance measures in this paper, the skill upgrading
measures are arguably the focus of our interest. Since the late 1980s, there has been a rising
concern about low-skilled workers in developed countries. Both job opportunities and wages
for low-skilled workers are decreasing relative to high-skilled workers. Several explanations
have been put forward including trade-induced technological change (Bloom et al. 2008)
as well as more recent theories on the oshoring of tasks (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg,
2008). While labor economists have provided a sizable amount of rm-level evidence relating
technological change and within rm skill upgrading,2 rm-level trade studies focusing on
trade channels have only started to surface.3 The rapid growth of a country like China
provides a nice opportunity to study its role in these events. In this paper we set out to test
for a causal relationship between imports and the skill structure of Belgian rms. Our data
allows us to single out the dierential impact of import competition and outsourcing as well
as to measure workers' skill by their education level, which enables us to go beyond the crude
distinction between production and nonproduction workers used in the literature (Feenstra
and Hanson, 1996; Machin and Van Reenen, 1998).
Our main ndings show that China is dierent from other low-wage countries but also
1Feenstra and Hanson (1999) for the US, Hijzen et al. (2005) for the UK, Falk and Koebel (2002) for
Germany, etc.
2See, for example, Levy and Murnane (1996), Doms, Dunne and Troske (1997), and Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson,
and Hitt (2002).
3There exist some rm-level studies relating skill upgrading within multi-national rms, such as Head and
Ries (2002) for Japanese multinationals, Hansson (2005) for Swedish multinationals, and Castellani et al. (2008)
for Italian multinationals. However, such contributions focus on a special group of rms (multinationals) only
and it is thus questionable how to extend results to a larger spectrum of rms. Our paper also relates to some
rm-level analysis about developing countries and trade, such as Bustos (2005) for Argentina and Verhoogen
(2008) for Mexico.
3dierent from OECD countries and its separate inclusion in the analysis brings out new
results. Both industry-level import competition and rm-level outsourcing of nished goods
from China reduce rm employment growth and induce skill upgrading. In contrast, industry-
level imports have no eect on Belgian rm survival, while rm-level outsourcing of nished
goods to China even increased rm's probability of survival. The eect of Chinese imports is
large in terms of skill upgrading. Import competition from China accounts for 42% (20%) of
the within rm increase in the share of skilled workers (non-production workers) in Belgian
manufacturing over the period of our analysis, but these eects, as well as the employment
growth eect, remain mainly in low-tech industries. Firm-level outsourcing to China of both
nished and intermediate goods further accounts for a small but signicant increase in the
share of non-production workers. These changes in employment structure are in line with
predictions of oshoring models and Schott's (2008) 'moving up the quality ladder' story
while complementing the ndings about import competition from China and technological
upgrade by Bloom et al. (2008).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we we briey review
the theoretical literature relating trade and skill upgrading. Section 3 describes the data and
the instrumental variables. Section 4 contains summary statistics and takes a rst look at
the evidence. In Section 5 we present the econometric model and discuss estimations results.
Section 6 is a concluding one.
2 Theoretical background on skill upgrading
The strongest result arising from our study is the positive eect of import competition from
and outsourcing to China on skill-upgrading in Belgian manufacturing. In this Section we
briey review the theoretical literature relating trade to the demand of workers with dierent
skill levels.
So far, the favorite explanation for the increase in relative demand of skilled workers in
developed countries is the 'skill-biased technological change' (SBTC). The main reasons that
led economists to favor SBTC over trade-related alternative stories are as follows. First, skill
upgrading was found to occur mainly within industries rather than between industries, which
4contrasts the prediction of the standard Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) theory (Berman, Bound and
Griliches, 1994). Second, skill upgrading not only occurred in developed countries but also
in developing countries, which also goes against HO. Third, product-price studies revealed
that the prices of labor intensive goods did not decrease signicantly relative to skill intensive
goods in developed countries. This violates the prediction of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem
(Lawrence and Slaughter, 1993, Leamer, 1996, and Baldwin and Cain, 2000). Finally, factor
content calculations revealed that trade with developing countries was not important enough
to have a major impact on employment structure in developed countries (see, e.g., Krugman,
1995).
However, some recent developments in both trade theory and applied trade analyses have
challenged this view. First, some scholars have stressed the complementarity between trade
and technology. Trade liberalization may alter the returns of dierent alternative technologies
and induce skill-biased technological change and skill upgrading (Wood, 1998, Acemoglu,
2003, Ekholm and Midelfart, 2005, Bloom et al., 2008 ). This view makes the trade-based
explanation consistent with the technology-based one. Additionally, trade economists have
recently extended the traditional HO model and shifted the focus away from trade in goods
to trade in tasks and oshoring (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996, Feenstra and Hanson, 2001,
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008). This shift in focus makes trade-induced within industry
skill upgrading possible. Trade in tasks can explain why both developed and developing
countries can experience skill upgrading after trade liberalization. By oshoring its most
labor intensive tasks, skill intensity in developed countries rises while the newly oshored tasks
going to developing countries tend to be more skill intensive than those already performed
there.
In short, there are reasons to believe that trade is an important mechanisms aecting em-
ployment structure changes in the developed countries. While most of the above mentioned
debate has an industry-level focus, in this paper we go one step further by looking at within
rm employment outcomes and in particular skill upgrading. Within rm skill upgrading
naturally follows from the above mentioned within industry mechanisms as long as one con-
siders homogeneous rms. However, as emphasized by BJS (2006), if rms are heterogeneous
in dimensions that aect their likelihood to grow, survive, and update their production pro-
5cess then a substantial part of skill upgrading within an industry may occur across rms.
Throughout our analysis, we will pay attention to this complementary reallocation mecha-
nisms.
We see at least three mechanisms through which trade may induce within rm skill up-
grading. First, trade may induce within rm technology upgrading which, to the extent the
later is a skill-biased, will increase rm's relative employment of skilled workers (Bloom et
al. 2008). Second, multi-product rms may specialize in more skill intensive products when
facing competition from low-wage imports, which will also induce within rm skill upgrading
(Bernard et al, 2010). Finally, rms have the option to outsource the labor intensive stages of
the production process to low-wage countries so increasing their demand for skilled workers
(Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008).
3 Data
In this Section we provide details about the data and the methodology used in order to con-
struct our measures of import competition and outsourcing, rm-level outcomes and control
variables, as well as instruments.
3.1 Measuring import competition: industry-level import and production
data
Industry-level imports data comes from the ComExt Intra- and Extra-European Trade Data,
which is an harmonized and comparable statistical database for EU countries merchandize
trade. The database is compiled by Eurostat using statistics from the member states. We
extract data on both Belgian and EU15 manufacturing imports by country of origin and
by 4-digit NACE rev.1.1 industry for the period 1995-2007. Then we categorize countries
into four groups: OECD countries, China, other low-wage countries (BJS), and the rest of
the world. The denition for low-wage country is from Table 1 in BJS (2006), where they
consider countries with less than 5 percent of U.S. per capita GDP in 1992 as low-wage
countries. According to such denition, major labor-abundant countries like China, India and
Vietnam are all classied as low-wage. Unlike BJS (2006), we distinguish China from BJS
6countries.
We use the variable import share4 to measure the degree of import competition faced by
Belgian rms from the dierent country groups at the four digit NACE code industry level.
Our working hypothesis is, as in BJS (2006), that rms within an industry experience a similar
competitive pressure on their nal products which can be proxied by the importance of imports
of the same products from other countries. We construct two distinct import share measures
for Belgium and the EU15. We use the Belgian import share in our baseline estimations and
report results based on the EU15 import share in the Appendix.5 IMPSHAREc
jt denotes








jt and IMjt represent (respectively) the value of imports from country group c and
all countries. PRjt is Belgian domestic production of industry j in year t and comes from the
Prodcom dataset also provided by Eurostat.
3.2 Measuring outsourcing: rm-level import data
Belgian imports data by year, rm, product (CN8 nomenclature), and country are provided
by the National Bank of Belgium (nbb) and cover the period 1995-2007. Micro trade data
are collected by the nbb on a monthly basis from Intrastat (intra-EU trade) and Extrastat
(extra-EU trade) declarations that cover the universe of trade transactions.6 The reliability
of the trade declaration data builds upon the mandatory VAT returns that rms are obliged
4We use import share, rather than import penetration as dened in BJS (2006), because of some peculiar
feature of Belgium. Belgium is a super-trader and, in a few 4 digit industries, exports are larger than the sum
of import and production causing import penetration to be negative. This is another reason why we report
results based on EU15 imports as a robustness check.
5The reasons we use EU15 import share for robustness are as follows. First, some imports of other EU15
countries from China may be re-exported to Belgium. Second, Belgian rms export a lot to EU market.
Imports from China by other EU countries may thus reduce their imports from Belgium so aecting Belgian
rms.
6For intra-EU trade, the threshold above which a legal obligation to declare exports arises is (from 1st
January 2006 onwards) 1 million euros. The threshold has changed over time going from 104,105 euros for the
period 1993-1997, to 250,000 euros for the period 1998-2005. Firms trading less than 1 million euros represent
less than 1% of aggregated exports. Moreover, rms often do provide information about their trade even when
they are below the threshold. Extra-EU trade is virtually exhaustive with the legal requirement for declaration
being a value of 1,000 euros or more or a weight of 1,000 kg or more.
7to le either monthly or quarterly depending the volume of sales and purchase of goods. Sales
and purchases involving a non-resident must be separately indicated in VAT returns due to the
dierent treatment of these operation with respect to the VAT tax. This information is then
used by the nbb to identify rms involved in trade activities which are then required to le,
whenever relevant, the Intrastat and/or Extrastat declaration. Balance sheet and trade data
were merged using the VAT number which uniquely identies rms in Belgium. The trade
data is extremely rich and comparable in quality to the widely known French Customs data
used by Eaton et al. (2004) among others. Information about the nature of the transaction is
also available and, for the purpose of our analysis, we concentrate on transactions involving
transfer of ownership so leaving aside trade related to (i) work done; and (ii) return and
replacement of goods.
As above argued, outsourcing cannot be properly analyzed at the industry level using
input-output tables. We thus follow Biscourp and Kramarz (2007) and use rm-level imports.
In order to capture the dierent facets of outsourcing we rst divide a rm's imports into two
categories: imports of nished goods and imports of intermediate goods. Finished goods are
dened as CN8 products that correspond to the same 3-digit NACE code of the main activity
of the rm.7 Other imports are dened as imports of intermediate goods. The purpose of this
distinction is to broadly account for the dierent nature of imports of goods that are `ready
to sell' versus imports of goods that will be further processed within the rm. Our measure







it corresponds to rm i imports of nished goods from country group c in year t
and Tit is rm turnover in year t. Outsourcing of intermediate goods by rm i at time t from
country group c (OUTINTc







it corresponds to rm i imports of intermediate goods from country group c in
7A detailed correspondence table between CN8 and NACE 3-digit codes across time have been provided by
the nbb.
8year t. As for country groups, we build on the same partition used for industry-level imports
shares IMPSHAREc
jt, i.e. OECD countries, China, other low-wage countries (BJS), and the
rest of the world.
3.3 Firm-level outcomes and controls: balance sheet data
Firm-level balance sheet data over the period 1996-2007 comes from the Business Registry
covering the population of Belgian rms required to le their (unconsolidated) accounts to
the nbb. The data combine annual accounts gures with data from the Crossroads Bank
on rms' main sector, activity and legal status. Overall, most rms that are registered in
Belgium (i.e., that exist as a separate legal entity) and have limited liability are required to
le annual accounts.8 Specically, all limited-liability rms that are incorporated in Belgium
have to report unconsolidated accounts involving balance sheet items and income statements.
Belgian rms that are in addition part of a group also have to submit consolidated accounts
where they report the joint group's activities in a consolidated way. However, Belgian aliates
of a foreign group which do not exist as a separate legal entity in Belgium are not required
to report unconsolidated accounts (they are required to le a consolidated account, but these
data do not allow us to obtain rm-level characteristics for the Belgian aliate). There are
two types of annual accounts: full and abbreviated. Firms have to le a full annual account
when they exceed at least two of the following three cutos: (i) employ at least 50 employees;
(ii) have an annual turnover of more than 7.3 million euros; and (iii) report total assets of
more than 3.65 million euros.
For this study, we selected those companies with their main activity in the manufacturing
sector (NACE 2-digits codes 15 to 37) that led a full-format or abbreviated balance sheet
between 1996 and 2007. This provides us with about 15,000 rms per year for which all
the relevant information is available. The data coverage, compared with other European
rm-level data, is particularly good. For example, despite France has almost 6 times more
manufacturing employment than Belgium, the well-known French EAE (Enqu^ ete Annuelle
8Exceptions include: sole traders; small companies whose members have unlimited liability; general partner-
ships; ordinary limited partnerships; cooperative limited liability companies; large companies whose members
have unlimited liability, if none of the members is a legal entity; public utilities; agricultural partnerships;
hospitals, unless they have taken the form of a trading company with limited liability; health insurance funds;
professional associations; schools and higher education institutions.
9Entreprise) manufacturing rms database contains data on about `only' 25,000 rms.
Using the information from the balance sheet data, we construct a battery of rms' co-
variates and retrieve the main NACE 5-digit activity code of each rm. NP/Eit is the share of
non-production workers of rm i at time t, which is dened as the ratio of non-manual workers
NP (including managers) to total employment E,9 and is a proxy for the skill intensity of the
workforce. The log of tangible assets per worker { log(K/E)it { is instead used as a measure of
capital intensity while log value added per worker { log(VA/E)it { and log total employment {
log(E)it { are used as measures for labor productivity and rm size, respectively. As standard
in the empirical Industrial Organization literature we also consider the log of rm age plus
one { log(Age)it. Finally, we use intangible assets per worker { log(Intang.K/E)it { to control
for technology-related expenditure within the rm.10
As for dependant variables, we consider a number of measures of rm performances/employment
structure. To limit endogeneity problems, we follow Bernard and Jensen (2004) and use rm
covariates at time t and dependent variables at time t + 1. The rst dependent variables is
rm growth (Eit+1), which is dened as the log dierence between a rm total employment
in year t + 1 and t. The second one is rm exit (Deathit+1), which is dened as disappearing
from the balance sheet dataset for at least two consecutive years starting from t + 1. We
then further consider two measures of the skill level of a rm workforce. The rst one is the
previously mentioned share of non-production workers that we take at time t+1 (NP/Eit+1).
The second one is a measure of the educational level of the workforce. While most related
empirical papers use the share of non-production workers to measure skill, we are able to go
further thanks to a unique feature of the data. We are indeed able to track, for rms with
full-format balance sheets only (essentially large rms), the educational level of workers that
enter and exit a rm in each year. At the cost of decreasing sample size, we are thus able
to construct a proxy for the share of skilled workers based on education.11 In particular our
measure Sit+1 is based on the following time decomposition:
9We use full time equivalent as a measure for employment.
10Intangible assets include patents, licences, and R&D capitalized costs as well as goodwill.
11In what follows, we consider a worker as being skilled upon having more than secondary school education












where skillit+1 is the number of skilled workers in rm i at time t+1, and skill net flow0:t+1
i
is the net inow (i.e., gross inow minus gross outow) of skilled workers between year 0
and year t + 1 for rm i. The only term on the righthand side of equation (1) which is
unobservable in our data is skilli0, i.e. the initial number of skilled workers in rm i. We
use the oldest available information (year 1996) about non-production workers and re-scale
it to match aggregate gures on the stock of skilled workers in manufacturing12 as a proxy
for skilli0. We acknowledge that such measure is prone to measurement error and so results
concerning Sit+1 should be taken with caution even in IV estimations.
3.4 Instrumental variables




der to solve the potential endogeneity problems arising with these variables we use exchange
rates and ad valorem taris data to construct instrumental variables for both industry-level
(import share) and rm-level (outsourcing of nished and intermediate goods) imports. From
the perspective of a Belgian rm, IMPSHAREc
jt can be reasonably considered as given in
her optimization process. However, while simultaneity is likely not to be an issue, omitted
variables is. Import shares and their evolution over time might indeed be correlated with
unobserved factors that cause the analyzed outcome like, for example, technological progress.
On the other hand, for OUTFINc
it and OUTINTc
it simultaneity is possibly the main source
of endogeneity because the choice of a rm to outsource is likely to both aect and being
aected by other rm decisions. The main insight of our IV strategy is to exploit the ex-





Exchange rates data comes from the IFS database compiled by the IMF. Ad valorem
tari data comes from the online customs tari database, also called the TARIC, provided by
European Commission. Such dataset integrates all tari-like restrictions applying to goods
that enter the EU market by country of origin and CN8 code for several years. The fact that
12Aggregate gures on the stock of skilled workers by industry come from the Belgian labor force survey.
11detailed tari information is available along two dimensions (country and product) is a pretty
unique feature of these data compared to, for example, the widely used UNCTAD's TRAINS
data base in which only information at the HS6 digit is available. Although the database
contains information about many trade restrictive measures (like quotas, weight-based tari,
etc.) we only use ad valorem taris to construct our IVs. To construct a comprehensive trade
barrier index that utilizes information on all trade measures is in fact both cumbersome and
highly questionable. For this reason we decide to focus on ad valorem tari data only.
We use exchange rates in order to construct both group c-industry specic and group
c-rm specic IVs for, respectively, industry-level and rm-level imports. To this end we
exploit trade ratios using them as weights. We denote by IV EXCHSHAc
jt the exchange rate
IV for IMPSHAREc
jt and by IV EXCHFINc
it (IV EXCHINTc
it ) the exchange rate IV for




























where h denotes a country, EXCH denotes exchange rates, and 0 denotes the initial value
of the corresponding variable. We use the oldest information on trade ratios only (1995)
rather than the contemporaneous one because the current trade ratio is likely to be endoge-
nous. We further consider rm turnover rather than rm total imports as the denominator of
IV EXCHFINc
it and IV EXCHINTc
it because the variable would otherwise be dened for
importing rms only.
Similarly, denoting by IV DUTY SHAc
jt the tari IV for IMPSHAREc
jt, and by IV DUTY FINc
it
(IV DUTY INTc





























where D denotes ad valorem taris, p denotes an 8-digit CN product code, and fp (ip) denotes
the set of nished (intermediate) goods.13 Again, we use the oldest information on trade ratios
only to be on the safe side.
4 A few intriguing gures and descriptive statistics
In this Section we provide some aggregate descriptive information on the key variables we
use both at the whole manufacturing level and at two digit NACE industry level. Figure 1
shows that the import share of China for manufacturing as a whole increased substantially
during the period 1996-2007. Starting from the same level as other low-wage countries in
1996, China's import share triplicate during the period while the import share of other low-
wage countries has only slightly increased. This remarkable dierence is one of the empirical
facts that make us believe that China needs to be treated separately. Incidentally in 2001,
which is the year China ocially entered WTO, Belgian manufacturing employment started,
as showed in Figure 2, to fall sharply. Is it China to blame for this? The answer that we
provide in the next Section is actually \not much".
Figures 1 and 2 just display two common time trends without any pretence of causality.
However, they have the virtue of summarizing rather well what is the common fear about
the increase in competition due to Chinese imports: employment losses. What is usually
less emphasized is that another performance measure is also correlated with the increase in
China`s import share: the skill upgrading of the workforce. Figures 3 and 4 show the evolution
over the period 1996-2007 of, respectively, the share of non-production workers and the share
13It is important to stress that both fp and ip are rm-time specic as they depend on the NACE 3-digit
industry code of a rm.
13of skilled workers in Belgian manufacturing. Both are indeed steadily increasing over time
(especially after 1998) and we will show in the next Section that import competition from
China has largely contributed to within rm skill upgrading.
Last but not least, what makes the picture even more interesting is the fact that import
competition is not the only channel via which Chinese and other low-wage countries imports
are eventually aecting manufacturing rm in the western world. Some Chinese goods are in
fact directly imported by manufacturing rms for either immediate sale (nished goods) or
further processing (intermediate goods). This is a rather dierent form of trade for these rms
who might actually benet a lot in terms of increased performance and protability. Figures
5 and 6 shows the time evolution of the share (%) of Belgian manufacturing rms involved,
respectively, in outsourcing of nished and intermediate goods with China and other low-wage
countries over the period 1996-2007. Again, a rather at line for BJS countries and a straight
increasing line for China. Is outsourcing more or less important than import competition
for rm performances? The evidence we provide in the next Section points towards import
competition having a much sizeable eect on rms.
The above evidence does not certainly provide a basis for casual statements and econo-
metric analysis is needed. This is the goal of the next Section. However, one necessary
condition to reach some conclusions is that there is enough identifying variation in the data.
Our key explanatory variables vary across the NACE 4-digit (import share) and rm (out-
sourcing of nished and intermediate goods) dimensions. Table 1 provides evidence that there
is already considerable variation in our dependent variables across the relatively aggregated
NACE 2-digit breakdown over the period of analysis. While being strongly negative in the
case of Apparel and Leather product and footwear, employment growth has been remarkable
for Oce machinery and computers. On the other hand the Apparel and Leather product
and footwear industries have experienced an impressive increase in both the share of non-
production and skilled workers. However, the Other Transportation equipment industry has
also experienced a noticeable skill upgrade while keeping a modest exit rate and a pretty good
employment growth.
Tables 2 to 4 further report the value and changes of our main explanatory variables over
the sample period by NACE 2-digit industry. As in the previous case, these Tables highlight
14the fact that there is quite a lot of variation even at the relatively aggregated NACE 2-digit
breakdown. Table 2 shows the value of the import share of China and other low-wage countries
in 1996 and 2007 as well as their change over the period. One can see, the import share of both
China and other low-wage countries increased in almost all industries, but Chinese imports
increased generally faster, especially in relative high-tech industries like oce machinery and
computers, electrical machinery, radio, TV and communication equipment, etc. Actually, even
in 2007, imports from other low-wage countries still concentrate on low-tech industries like
textile, apparel and leather goods, while Chinese imports span both low-tech and high-tech
industries from the beginning of the period. This fact is in line with the literature emphasizing
the relative sophistication of Chinese exports (Schott, 2008).
Table 3 and 4 report, respectively, the 1996 and 2007 levels (and change) of the share
of rms that are involved in outsourcing of nished and intermediate goods from China and
other low-wage countries by NACE 2-digit industry. The pattern is similar to that shown
in Table 2: more and more rms start importing from low-wage countries over the period,
especially from China. There is a lot of heterogeneity across industries with, for example,
the Radio, TV and Communication Equipment industry experiencing the highest level and
increase of the share of rms importing nished and intermediate goods from China. Though
this industry might, to some extent, be considered as low tech, the increase in the share of
outsourcing rms from China in the Chemical industry speaks about the high technological
content of some Chinese products.
5 Econometric results
In this Section we analyze the impact of both import competition and outsourcing on four
rm outcome measures: employment growth, rm exit, share of blue collar workers and share
of skilled (highly educated) workers. Import competition (IMPSHAREc
jt) is measured by
industry-level import shares from the four dierent country groups (OECD, China, BJS,
Other). As in BJS (2006), our underlying assumption is that rms within an industry ex-
perience a similar competitive pressure on their nal products which can be proxied by the
importance of imports of the same goods from other countries. As for outsourcing, we de-
15part from the standard practice of using aggregate data and input-output tables and follow
Biscourp and Kramarz (2007) by using rm-level imports. In order to capture the dierent
facets of outsourcing we divide, for each country group, a rm's imports into two categories:
imports of nished goods (OUTFINc
it) and imports of intermediate goods (OUTINTc
it).
In order to solve the potential endogeneity problems arising from omitted variables and
simultaneity we use exchange rates and ad valorem taris data to construct instrumental
variables. The main insight of our IV strategy is to exploit the exogenous variation of trade-




it. In particular, we use 1995 industry (rm) weights in order to minimize the
issue of the endogeneity of weights for import share (rm outsourcing).
5.1 Econometric model
Equation (2) is based on BJS (2006) and the dependant variable (Yit+1) will be either rm
employment growth (Eit+1), or rm exit (Deathit+1), or the rm share of non-production
workers (NP/Eit+1) or its share of skilled workers (S/Eit+1). Vit is a vector of time-varying
rm i controls including rm size, age, labor productivity, capital intensity, and its intangible
capital intensity (the latter being used as control for expenditure in technology). When con-
sidering employment growth and rm exit we also include the current share of non-production
workers as a further control in Vit. T1jt is instead a vector containing the time-varying indus-
try j-level variables which measure the degree of import competition from dierent country
groups (IMPSHAREc
jt). T2it, which is not considered in BJS (2006), is a vector contain-
ing the time-varying rm-level variables which measure the importance of outsourcing of nal
(OUTFINc
it) and intermediate (OUTINTc
it) goods from the dierent country groups. Finally,
t is a vector of time dummies and i is rm xed eect.






it2 + t + i + "it (2)
Following BJS (2006), in additional specications we have interacted T1jt and T2it with
some rm characteristics (factor intensities and labor productivity) in order to account for the
impact of import competition and outsourcing across rms within an industry. We do not nd
16any signicant eect for the interaction between outsourcing and rm characteristics, while
for import competition we nd some results for employment growth and rm exit only. We
thus report only results about interactions of import competition in the case of employment
growth and rm exit.
In some other specications we interact T1jt with categorial dummies indicating whether
a given NACE 4-digit industry is low, medium-low, medium-high, or high-tech. The tech-
nological ranking of industries we build upon, reported in Figure 7, has been obtained by
Eurostat based on R&D spending statistics. The purpose of this exercise is to see whether
Chinese import competition have dierent eects on rms in industries characterized by dif-
ferent technology levels. While it is clear from the descriptive statistics in the previous Section
that sizeable imports from China can be found in both low- and high-tech industries, it is less
clear whether the competitive pressure they exsert on rms is the same.
For all of the above estimations, we use exchange rates and ad valorem taris data to
construct IV's for import competition and outsourcing of nished and intermediate goods.
For rm-level trade, lagged rm-level imports are also used as instruments. The estimation
results are shown in Tables 5 to ??. Tables 5 to 7 show estimation results for equation (2) for
employment growth and rm exit with the rst two Tables focusing on import competition
and the last one on rm-level outsourcing. Tables ?? to 10 show estimation results of equation
(2) for the share of non-production and the share of skilled workers with the rst two Tables
being devoted to import competition and the last one to outsourcing. Tables ?? to 16 in
the Appendix provide robust evidence of our results by using industry-level import shares of
the EU15 (instead of Belgium) as measures of import competition from the dierent country
groups. Results are virtually identical and so we will not discuss them any further.
We use robust standard errors and statistics. At the bottom of each Table we report the
under-identication (Kleibergen-Paap LM), weak identication (Kleibergen-Paap Wald F),
and over-identication (Hansen J) statistics and p-vales. The number of endogenous variables
and number of instruments are also indicated along with the number of observations, rms,
and the R2. Results indicates that our instruments for both industry-level and rm-level trade
are overall not weak. At the same time, however, the Hansen J statistic sometimes rejects the
null of no over-identication when industry-level import competition is instrumented. This
17suggests that caution is needed in such cases. Note that such problem does not arises in the
regressions where only outsourcing of nished and intermediate goods is instrumented.
5.2 Employment growth
Table 5 reports the relationship between rm employment growth and import competition
for our four country groups: OECD, China, other low-wage countries (BJS), and the rest
of the world (Other). In order to make our results comparable to previous studies, and in
particular to BJS (2006), we do not consider for the moment rm-level outsourcing variables,
i.e. the vector T2it, in the estimation of (2). The rst three columns report within estimates
while the remaining three columns report IV estimates. Columns 1 and 4 refer to the baseline
specication. In columns 2 and 5, we add interaction terms of some rm characteristics
(share of non-production workers, capital intensity and productivity) with both Chinese and
BJS import shares. In column 3 and 6 we instead consider interaction terms of industry-
level categorial dummies measuring technological intensity with China's import share.14 In
all the regressions, we include year and rm xed eects to control for aggregate trends in
manufacturing employment growth and unobserved (time-invariant) rm characteristics.
Within estimation results in column 1 reveal that employment growth is negatively as-
sociated to import competition from China as well as BJS countries with roughly similar
magnitudes. This is not the case for both OECD and Other countries' import competi-
tion which have insignicant coecients. These nding echoes those of BJS (2006) and are
partially conrmed by IV estimations in column 4. Indeed, when instrumenting, only im-
port competition from BJS countries has a signicant (and larger) coecient with respect
to China. Columns 5 and 6 further qualify IV results. The interactions of IMPSHAREc
jt
for BJS countries and China with rm characteristics indicate that, contrary to the case of
BJS countries, Chinese imports are inducing a re-allocation of resources across Belgian rms
characterized by dierent capital intensities. In particular, rms with high capital intensity
are particularly hit by Chinese import competition which is somewhat in line with the Schott
(2008) story discussed earlier. However, capital intensity does not necessarily correspond to
high-tech. Indeed, column 6 indicates that the only group of industries whose employment
14The omitted category refers to low-tech industries. See the data Section and Figure 7 for further details.
18growth is signicantly aected by import competition from China is the excluded category (i.e.
the low-tech). As for other industries, the sum of the reference category parameter and the
interaction term is in fact never signicant. Last but not least, the implied growth magnitude
of our coecients is far from being shocking. The average rm yearly employment growth
in our panel data is 0.58%. Taking the coecient value corresponding to low-tech industries
(who account for roughly 36% of Belgian manufacturing employment) in column 6 (-0.5167)
and considering that the average across rms (belonging to this subset of manufacturing) of
IMPSHAREc
jt for China has steadily increased from 0.0138 in 1996 to 0.0502 in 2007, we
get that import competition from China could be blamed for a -0.5167  0.0138=-0.71% rm
employment growth eect in 1996 and a -0.5167  0.0502=-2.59% rm employment growth
eect in 2007. As for other low wage countries, using the coecient in column 6, which now
refers to all manufacturing, and the average import shares in 1996 and 2007 reveals that im-
port competition from BJS countries turns into a -0.47% growth eect for 1996 and a -1.19%
growth eect in 2007.
Overall, our qualitative ndings so far are in line with the existing literature while further
qualifying China as being dierent from other low-wage countries. Though, our Hansen J
calls for caution and we cannot unfortunately compare the quality of our over-identifying
restrictions with previous studies.15 In Table ?? we report results on the relationship between
employment growth and rm-level trade which are given in the rst 3 columns. The full
econometric model in (2) is now estimated with column 1 (2 and 3) providing within (IV)
estimates. Import competition variables, i.e. the vector T1it, is included but coecients are
not reported in order to save space. Our preferred specication is the one in column 3 where
industry-level trade, in contrast to column 2, is not instrumented and our Hansen J statistic
does not reject the validity of our instruments.
Two key features stand out from our results. First of all, contrary to a widespread fear,
rm outsourcing does not dramatically aect rm employment growth. This is certainly the
rst order eect and comes from coecients being almost never signicant or, when they are
signicant, having a small magnitude. The coecient on imports of intermediates from OECD
15Though the number of instruments in BJS (2006) is larger than the number of endogenous variables, no
over-identifying test statistic is provided and/or mentioned.
19countries (0.1296) is actually positive and signicant. The relatively stable over time mean of
OUTINTc
it for OECD countries across manufacturing rm is 0.0396 meaning that this type
of outsourcing accounts for a 0.1296  0.0396=0.51% rm employment growth eect. While
the coecient of outsourcing of nished goods to China (-0.3182) is signicant and negative,
it is in the end economically small. Outsourcing to China steadily increased from 0.0005 in
1996 to 0.0015 in 2007 implying that it accounted only for -0.3182  0.0015=-0.05% rm
employment growth in Belgian rm level manufacturing in 2007.
Two comments are in order. First, our rm-level analysis conrms both the ambiguity and
the limited impact of outsourcing on employment found in previous industry-level studies in
the literature (Amiti and Shang-Jin Wei, 2005). Second, our nding on China is in line with
the hypothesis put forward by Biscourp and Kramarz (2007) that outsourcing to low wage
countries has a negative eect on rm employment only when the imported goods are nal
in nature. While Biscourp and Kramarz (2007) could only perform a correlation exercise our
IV results suggest, at least for China, a deeper causal relationship.
5.3 Firm exit
Table 6 repots the relationship between rm exit and import competition from dierent coun-
try groups while columns 4, 5 and 6 of Table 7 contains our estimations of the full model for
rm exit with a focus on the role of outsourcing. The structure of the dierent specications
presented is the same as for employment growth.
Focusing on IV results in Table 6 reveals that, contrary to import competition for other
low-wage countries, imports from China are not increasing the likelihood of rm exit. This
is again another dimension in which China is dierent from BJS countries whose import
competition instead induces signicantly more exit. OECD countries behave like China in
that their import competition does not signicantly aect rm survival while imports from
other countries actually decrease the likelihood of exit. This latter result is quite puzzling
and might be related to measurement error in this residual country category.
Interactions with rm-level variables in column 5 further indicate that neither for China
nor for BJS countries there is a strong evidence of an heterogenous rm response. Only
20the interaction between import competition from BJS countries and productivity is in fact
signicant at the 10% level. Moreover, results from column 6 actually suggest (although
signicance is weak) that Chinese imports decrease exit in high-tech industries. This nding
conrms the descriptive evidence we provided about the active role of China in high-tech
industries and might reect the existence of some complementarities. Implied magnitudes of
signicant coecients are, in line with the case of employment growth, not stunning. The
unconditional probability of rm exit in the panel is 11.92% and import competition from
BJS countries increases the probability of exit by 0.44% in 1996 and 1.00% in 2007.
Overall, our ndings on import competition are again in line with the existing literature
while further qualifying China as being dierent from other low-wage countries. We now turn
to IV results about the role of rm-level outsourcing on exit reported in Table 7. For the
same reasons explained above, the specication in column 6 is our preferred one. Again, the
big picture is that most coecients are not signicant and/or small with results for China
and OCED standing out. Outsourcing of nished goods from OECD countries increase the
likelihood of rm exit. This might be due to rms moving out of Belgium to the country of
origin of nal goods sourcing. On the other hand, outsourcing of intermediate (nished) goods
from China increases (decreases) the probability of exiting. Combined with the previously
identied negative impact on rm employment growth, our nding on nished goods depicts
a scenario in which rms respond to globalization by outsourcing some of their jobs to China
(via the import of nished goods) but in turn gets more competitive and are able to survive.
Finally, turning coecients into induced exit probabilities by means of average values
of OUTFINc
it and OUTINTc
it reveals that, in 2007, outsourcing of nished (intermediate)
goods with China causes a decrease (increase) of the exit probability of 0.03% (0.06%). As
for OECD countries, the eect of OUTFINc
it in 2007 is larger and equals 0.21%.
5.4 Skill upgrading
Tables 8 and 9 report the relationship of, respectively, rms's employment structure (share
of non-production workers) and skill intensity (share of skilled workers) with industry-level
import competition from dierent country groups. The rst two columns of each Table report
21within estimates while the remaining two columns report IV estimates. In column 2 and 4 of
each Table, we consider interaction terms of our industry-level categorial dummies measuring
technological intensity with the Chinese import share. In all the regressions, we include year
and rm xed eects to control for aggregate trends and unobserved (time-invariant) rm
characteristics.
The basic message from IV results of both Tables is the same: import competition from
China is inducing within rm skill upgrading by both fostering an increase of the share of
non-production workers and an increase in the share of workers with tertiary education. At
the same time neither import competition from OECD nor from other low-wage countries has
a signicant eect on skill upgrading. These original ndings are of high policy relevance and
pins down a key rm adjustment margin to globalization to be added to those identied in
BJS (2006).
The magnitude of the impact is big. NP/Eit+1 and S/Eit+1 are, contrary to employment
growth and rm exit, stock variables so that a more useful way of interpreting coecients'
magnitudes is to compute what share of the observed time change (between 1996 and 2007)
of NP/Eit+1 and S/Eit+1 can be accounted for by the time change of IMPSHAREc
jt. Doing
this back of the envelope calculation with coecients from column 3 reveals that import
competition from China is responsible for 19.77% (42.71%)16 of the increase in the share of
non-production (skilled) workers in Belgian manufacturing over our period of analysis. As
further shown in column 4, all of the adjustment is taking place in low-tech industries with,
for example, China accounting for 79.25% of the increase in the share of skilled workers in
these industries.
Skill upgrading in low-tech industries due to increased import competition from China has
to be compared with the negative impact we found on employment growth due to Chinese
imports and the non signicant eect on rm exit for those industries. Overall, our results
can be rationalized by the following argument. Even though imports from China raise the
degree of competition in the Belgian market pushing rms to reduce their employment, it
also induces rms to upgrade their technology and employment structure. In the presence of
16Using the rm sample in column 3 of Table 8, we get that the import share of China increased by 0.026
from 1996 to 2006, while NP/Eit+1 increased by 0.038 from 1997 to 2007, thus we get the contribution of
China's import share is 0.026 0.289/0.038=0.1977, or 19.77%, where 0.289 is the coecient of China's import
share in column 3 of table 8. The other numbers used in this Section are calculated in similar way.
22market failures limiting technology adoption, like those described in Bloom et al. (2008), this
may ultimately be benecial for rms and make them less likely to die. Bloom et al. (2008)
show that import competition from China is inducing a sizeable within rm technological
upgrade as measured by rm-level IT spending and patents. Our ndings complement their
results by pointing that such technological upgrade goes hand in hand with skill upgrading.
Skill upgrading certainly requires an upgrade of the technology used by rms and vice versa,
meaning that it is hard to disentangle the two. However, our results indicate that skill
upgrading in response to import competition from China is taking place over and above what
can be explained by our control variable measuring expenditure in technology. In this light,
the specialization of multi-product rms into more skill intensive products (Bernard et al,
2010) represents a plausible complementary explanation.
Table 10 reports our estimation results for skill upgrading and outsourcing. The rst three
columns report the relationship between the share of non-production workers and rm-level
imports while the last three columns contains results for the share of skilled workers. The
structure of the dierent specications presented is the same as for Table 7.
Looking at results for NP/Eit+1 reveals that rm-level outsourcing has, contrary to the
case of employment growth and exit, in many cases a signicant impact. A more careful
inspection tells us that in the IV specications, outsourcing of nished goods from all country
groups induces skill upgrading. This is a very strong result and is in line with, for example,
the trade-in-tasks model of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). To the extent that the nal
production stage (assembly) is low skill intensive as compared to other stages like design and
commercialization, the involvement of a rm into outsourcing of nal goods can reasonably
induce skill upgrading due to shift of a rm domestic activities towards more skill intensive
tasks. However, the magnitude of the eects we are talking about is rather small. Given
estimated coecients in column 3 and time changes of OUTFINc
it across the four country
groups, the increase in outsourcing (from all origins) of nal goods during the period 1996-
2007 accounts for a mere 0.50% of the increase in NP/Eit+1. Interestingly, China is dierent,
i.e., also the outsourcing of intermediate goods induces skill upgrading. Again, the eect is
small (0.68%).
The picture is quite dierent when looking at estimations for the share of skilled workers.
23In this case, only outsourcing from OECD countries has a signicant impact which is pointing
again towards skill upgrading. Both outsourcing of nal and intermediate goods to OECD
countries induces a within rm increase in the share of college educated workers with the
impact being stronger for the nished goods. Indeed, the time change of outsourcing of
nished (intermediate) goods to OECD countries accounts for 3.48% (1.06%) of the time
change of S/Eit+1 over our period of analysis.
6 Conclusion
Imports from China into Belgium have risen faster than from other low-wage country imports
in recent years. This paper evaluates the eect of both industry-wide and rm-level imports
from China separately from other countries' imports on Belgian manufacturing rms in terms
of employment growth, rm survival and skill-upgrading. In obtaining our results we use an
IV strategy exploiting product-country level ad-valorem taris and trade weighted exchange
rates as instruments.
We nd that, with respect to imports from other low-wage countries, Chinese imports
have a dierent impact on within rm-level employment changes. Import competition from
China signicantly and negatively aects employment growth, but only for rms in low tech
industries. Contrary to the popular belief, import competition from China does not nega-
tively aect rm survival in manufacturing. This result holds even when accounting for rm
heterogeneity within an industry. Our ndings on rm-level outsourcing actually suggest that
imports of nished goods decrease the probability of rm death. However, these eects are
small in magnitude.
The strongest result we obtain is about skill upgrading. Import competition from China
accounts for 42% (20%) of the within rm increase in the share of skilled workers (non-
production workers), with most of the adjustment taking place in low tech industries. Firm-
level outsourcing to China of both nished and intermediate goods further accounts for a small
but signicant increase in the share of non-production workers. These changes in employment
structure are in line with predictions of oshoring models and Schott's (2008) 'moving up the
quality ladder' story while complementing the ndings about import competition from China
24and technological upgrade by Bloom et al. (2008). Even though imports from China raise
the degree of competition in the Belgian market pushing rms to reduce their employment,
it also induces rms to upgrade their technology and employment structure. In the presence
of market failures limiting technology adoption, like those described in Bloom et al. (2008),
this may ultimately be benecial for rms and make them less likely to die.
We propose two directions for future research. First, the set of instruments for rm-
level outsourcing can be widened to improve instruments' strength further. Second, there are
other rm-level margins of adjustment in the face of import competition (such as product
switching, quality upgrading, technology upgrading) that are likely to be related to those we
examined and whose relative importance and interaction represent an interesting avenue for
future research.
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28Table 1: Evolution of dependent variables across manufacturing industries over the period of
analysis
Employment (FTE) Average rm Share of white collar Share of skilled workers
change (%) exit rate (%) change (percentage) change (percentage)
Nace Industry 96-07 96-05 96-07 96-07
15 Food -1.1 4.6 0.2 6.0
16 Tobacco -35.0 2.4 2.1 8.0
17 Textile -34.2 4.4 0.2 9.4
18 Apparel -57.1 6.0 20.7 19.9
19 Leather product and footwear -43.0 5.7 11.1 12.2
20 Wood products -0.1 3.7 -7.2 5.7
21 Paper -11.8 3.9 0.1 3.2
22 Publishing -13.7 5.1 6.9 22.2
23 Nuclear 17.8 4.4 14.9 0.5
24 Chemical 5.9 4.5 8.3 6.2
25 Rubber and plastic 10.9 3.8 4.8 3.4
26 Non-metallic mineral -10.7 3.7 1.4 9.5
27 Basic metal -23.0 4.5 -0.7 5.5
28 Fabricated metal 11.5 3.6 0.3 5.8
29 Machinery and equipment -0.4 4.2 0.6 9.3
30 Oce machinery and computers 56.8 5.6 4.1 -1.7
31 Electrical machinery -19.8 4.9 4.8 10.2
32 Radio. TV and Comm. Equip. -37.0 6.5 7.8 24.3
33 Medical and optical instr. 8.1 3.5 8.4 7.3
34 Motor vehicles -15.4 4.2 -8.5 3.5
35 Other transp. Equip. 19.5 5.2 13.4 4.9
36 Furniture and other -24.4 4.4 2.3 9.9
37 Recycle 14.0 4.8 -1.0 6.3
Total -9.1 4.4 2.9 8.3
Notes: 1. Firm exit after 2005 cannot be observed due to its denition.
Notes: 2. The share of skilled workers is available only for large rms, i.e. those ling a complete form.
Table 2: Import share of China and other low-wage countries across manufacturing industries
over the period of analysis
Import share (%) Import share(%) Import share
change
Nace Industry China 1996 BJS 1996 China 2007 BJS 2007 China 96-07 BJS 96-07
15 Food 0.1 0.5 0.4 1.0 0.2 0.5
16 Tobacco 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1
17 Textile 1.4 4.7 6.0 5.5 4.7 0.8
18 Apparel 4.2 4.9 21.7 12.0 17.4 7.1
19 Leather product and footwear 15.9 4.2 32.0 15.2 16.0 11.0
20 Wood products 0.7 0.3 3.9 0.6 3.2 0.3
21 Paper 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.8 0.0
22 Publishing 0.1 0.0 0.8 0.1 0.7 0.0
23 Nuclear NA NA NA NA NA NA
24 Chemical 0.4 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.1
25 Rubber and plastic 0.6 0.3 2.9 0.5 2.3 0.2
26 Non-metallic mineral 0.3 0.2 3.2 1.0 2.9 0.8
27 Basic metal 0.3 0.6 3.8 2.5 3.5 1.8
28 Fabricated metal 0.8 0.1 3.2 0.3 2.5 0.2
29 Machinery and equipment 0.6 0.0 3.1 0.2 2.5 0.2
30 Oce machinery and computers 1.6 0.0 16.8 0.0 15.1 0.0
31 Electrical machinery 1.3 0.0 5.6 0.4 4.3 0.3
32 Radio, TV and Comm. Equip. 3.5 0.0 10.3 0.3 6.9 0.3
33 Medical and optical instr. 1.8 0.0 3.8 0.4 2.0 0.3
34 Motor vehicles 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1
35 Other transp. Equip. 0.4 0.1 5.1 0.5 4.7 0.5
36 Furniture 3.8 8.3 13.4 13.2 9.6 4.9
37 Recycle 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0.9 0.9 3.0 1.3 2.1 0.4
Notes: NA for industry 23 means not available
29Table 3: Share of outsourcing rms in Belgium manufacturing industries (nished goods)
Share (%) of rms that import nished goods from Change
Nace Industry China 1996 BJS 1996 China 2007 BJS 2007 China 96-07 BJS 96-07
15 Food 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.2 0.2
16 Tobacco 0.0 7.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -7.1
17 Textile 0.8 2.4 4.5 4.2 3.7 1.8
18 Apparel 3.1 3.5 7.9 6.0 4.8 2.5
19 Leather product and footwear 7.4 6.7 9.4 5.5 2.0 -1.2
20 Wood products 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.4 0.4 -0.3
21 Paper 0.0 0.0 2.4 0.3 2.4 0.3
22 Publishing 0.4 0.1 0.8 0.3 0.4 0.2
23 Nuclear 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.0 0.0 7.0
24 Chemical 2.8 2.4 7.9 3.7 5.9 1.0
25 Rubber and plastic 0.7 0.9 6.6 1.9 5.1 1.3
26 Non-metallic mineral 0.2 3 4.5 2.3 4.3 -0.7
27 Basic metal 2.5 1.9 5.9 4.2 3.4 2.3
28 Fabricated metal 0.3 0.1 1.0 0.4 0.7 0.3
29 Machinery and equipment 0.8 1.1 4.5 2.1 3.7 1.0
30 Oce machinery and computers 2.6 1.3 4.5 1.5 1.9 0.2
31 Electrical machinery 1.7 1.0 9.0 2.8 7.3 1.8
32 Radio. TV and Comm. Equip. 4.4 2.2 14.0 4.1 9.6 1.9
33 Medical and optical instr. 0.6 0.4 3.2 1.3 2.6 0.9
34 Motor vehicles 0.3 0.3 3.9 1.6 3.6 1.3
35 Other transp. Equip. 1.0 0.0 4.2 2.3 3.2 2.3
36 Furniture 1.2 0.7 3.8 1.1 2.6 0.4
37 Recycle 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0.8 1.0 2.8 1.4 2.0 0.4
Table 4: Share of outsourcing rms in Belgium manufacturing industries (intermediate goods)
Share (%) of rms that import intermediate goods from Change
Nace Industry China 1996 BJS 1996 China 2007 BJS 2007 China 96-07 BJS 96-07
15 Food 1.1 1.1 2.4 1.3 1.3 0.2
16 Tobacco 14.3 42.9 10.3 51.7 -4.0 8.8
17 Textile 2.2 11.4 9.4 10.2 7.2 -1.2
18 Apparel 2.7 2.9 9.3 6.0 6.6 3.1
19 Leather product and footwear 6.7 4.4 6.3 2.4 -0.4 -2.0
20 Wood products 0.6 0.3 2.8 0.7 2.2 0.4
21 Paper 1.9 1.6 6.9 1.4 5.0 -0.2
22 Publishing 0.6 0.2 1.6 0.2 1.0. 0.0
23 Nuclear 3.1 0.0 9.3 0.0 6.2 0.0
24 Chemical 5.6 4.1 15.1 8.4 9.5 4.3
25 Rubber and plastic 1.3 1.7 10.6 4.8 9.3 3.1
26 Non-metallic mineral 0.8 2.0 5.9 3.1 5.1 1.1
27 Basic metal 4.3 2.8 14.1 6.5 9.8 3.7
28 Fabricated metal 0.5 0.5 3.5 1.0 3.0 0.5
29 Machinery and equipment 1.2 1.3 6.6 2.4 5.4 1.1
30 Oce machinery and computers 5.2 0.0 11.4 2.3 6.2 2.3
31 Electrical machinery 2.9 1.3 13.4 5.1 10.5 3.8
32 Radio. TV and Comm. Equip. 6.0 2.2 20.5 9.9 14.5 7.7
33 Medical and optical instr. 0.7 0.4 5.0 2.0 4.3 1.6
34 Motor vehicles 1.2 0.3 7.6 2.6 6.4 2.3
35 Other transp. Equip. 1.9 1.0 5.0 2.3 3.1 1.3
36 Furniture 1.3 1.3 3.6 1.3 2.3 0.0
37 Recycle 0.3 2.4 1.3 1.5 1.0 -0.9
Total 1.4 1.9 5.0 2.5 3.6 0.6
30Table 5: Import Competition Analysis. Employment Growth: Eit+1
Dep. Variable: Eit+1
Specication (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimation Method FE FE FE IV IV IV
Controls
NP/Eit -0.0966a -0.1017a -0.0953a -0.0953a -0.1055a -0.0941a
(0.0131) (0.0138) (0.0131) (0.0125) (0.0139) (0.0125)
log(K/E)it 0.0325a 0.0326a 0.0325a 0.0326a 0.0341a 0.0325a
(0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0022) (0.0019)
log(VA/E)it 0.0996a 0.0985a 0.0994a 0.0994a 0.0973a 0.0993a
(0.0046) (0.0049) (0.0046) (0.0043) (0.0047) (0.0043)
log(E)it -0.2680a -0.2682a -0.2691a -0.2696a -0.2703a -0.2706a
(0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0125) (0.0123)
log(Age)it -0.0161a -0.0154a -0.0164a -0.0154a -0.0142a -0.0157a
(0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0049) (0.0050) (0.0049)
log(Intang.K/E)it 0.0196c 0.0195c 0.0196c 0.0199c 0.0193c 0.0196c
(0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0110) (0.0109)
Import Competition Variables
OECD IMPSHAREjt 0.0296 0.0291 0.0274 0.1164 0.2210 0.0953
(0.0259) (0.0259) (0.0260) (0.2603) (0.2914) (0.2040)
Other IMPSHAREjt 0.0268 0.0259 -0.0087 1.0041b 0.7688c 0.5654
(0.0535) (0.0535) (0.0535) (0.4270) (0.4176) (0.3967)
BJS IMPSHAREjt -0.4593a -0.4932 -0.4842a -0.9198b -0.0296 -0.7063c







China IMPSHAREjt -0.3883a -0.2746 -0.5716a -0.2035 -0.9210b -0.5167b







Medium-low tech.jt 0.6773a 0.7517b
(0.1413) (0.3734)
Medium-high tech.jt 0.3904b 0.5634c
(0.1812) (0.2961)
High tech.jt 0.4054 -0.0239
(0.2943) (0.6602)
Number of endogenous variables 4 10 7
Number of instruments 8 20 14
Under-identication statistic 156.921 191.247 202.851
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Weak identication statistic 21.271 10.027 15.096
Hansen J statistic 42.775 57.086 43.342
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Firm xed eect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year xed eect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 119,399 119,399 119,399 117,526 117,526 117,526
R-squared 0.1681 0.1682 0.1684 0.1644 0.1654 0.1672
Number of rms 16,915 16,915 16,915 15,289 15,289 15,289
1.Robust standard errors (p-values) in parentheses for coecients (test statistics)
2.abcindicate the signicance of the coecient,a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
3.indicates the signicance of interaction plus the level coecient,  p<0.01,  p<0.05,  p<0.1
31Table 6: Import Competition Analysis. Firm Exit: Deathit+1
Dep. Variable: Deathit+1
Specication (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimation Method FE FE FE IV IV IV
Controls
NP/Eit -0.0008 -0.0012 -0.0010 -0.0005 0.0017 -0.0003
(0.0047) (0.0050) (0.0047) (0.0044) (0.0049) (0.0044)
log(K/E)it -0.0040a -0.0027a -0.0039a -0.0040a -0.0031a -0.0040a
(0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0009)
log(VA/E)it -0.0287a -0.0289a -0.0286a -0.0288a -0.0272a -0.0288a
(0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0023) (0.0019)
log(E)it -0.0189a -0.0189a -0.0188a -0.0208a -0.0201a -0.0210a
(0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043)
log(Age)it 0.0539a 0.0541a 0.0540a 0.0549a 0.0547a 0.0552a
(0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028)
log(Intang.K/E)it 0.0075c 0.0075c 0.0075c 0.0063 0.0065 0.0060
(0.0044) (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0039)
Import Competition Variables
OECD IMPSHAREjt 0.0102 0.0104 0.0099 0.1614 0.1505 0.1884c
(0.0112) (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.1327) (0.1286) (0.1100)
Other IMPSHAREjt 0.0200 0.0172 0.0270 -0.6189a -0.4346c -0.5234b
(0.0223) (0.0222) (0.0223) (0.2351) (0.2257) (0.2172)
BJS IMPSHAREjt 0.0795 -0.1486 0.0949 0.5927b -0.1735 0.5994b







China IMPSHAREjt 0.0006 -0.0398 0.0310 -0.2470 0.0193 -0.2167







Medium-low tech.jt -0.1621b 0.2056
(0.0658) (0.1821)
Medium-high tech.jt 0.0259 0.4140b
(0.0937) (0.1960)
High tech.jt -0.1340 -0.3244
(0.1260) (0.3339)
Number of endogenous variables 4 10 7
Number of instruments 8 20 14
Under-identication statistic 169.221 225.137 193.770
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Weak identication statistic 25.822 12.968 15.826
Hansen J statistic 1.395 23.006 3.005
(0.8450) (0.0107) (0.8845)
Firm xed eect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year xed eect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 116,140 116,140 116,140 114,474 114,474 114,474
R-squared 0.0261 0.0263 0.0261 0.0150 0.0200 0.0165
Number of rms 17,366 17,366 17,366 15,891 15,891 15,891
1.Robust standard errors (p-values) in parentheses for coecients (test statistics)
2.abcindicate the signicance of the coecient,a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
3.indicates the signicance of interaction plus the level coecient,  p<0.01,  p<0.05,  p<0.1
32Table 7: Firm-Level Outsourcing Analysis. Employment Growth (Eit+1) and Firm Exit
(Deathit+1)
Dep. Variable Eit+1 Eit+1 Eit+1 Deathit+1 Deathit+1 Deathit+1
Specication (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimation Method FE IV1 IV2 FE IV1 IV2
Controls (Import Competition Variables not Reported)
NP/Eit -0.0939a -0.0903a -0.0916a -0.0012 -0.0037 -0.0040
(0.0132) (0.0130) (0.0129) (0.0047) (0.0044) (0.0043)
log(K/E)it 0.0318a 0.0314a 0.0314a -0.0036a -0.0033a -0.0033a
(0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
log(VA/E)it 0.1073a 0.1154a 0.1154a -0.0320a -0.0377a -0.0375a
(0.0050) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0022)
log(E)it -0.2711a -0.2827a -0.2821a -0.0194a -0.0252a -0.0237a
(0.0123) (0.0107) (0.0104) (0.0047) (0.0043) (0.0042)
log(Age)it -0.0119b 0.0159b 0.0146b 0.0512a 0.0498a 0.0489a
(0.0055) (0.0064) (0.0061) (0.0030) (0.0034) (0.0032)
log(Intang.K/E)it 0.0184c 0.0067 0.0059 0.0074c 0.0039 0.0049
(0.0109) (0.0086) (0.0084) (0.0044) (0.0039) (0.0038)
Firm-Level Outsourcing Variables
OECD OUTFINit 0.0079 -0.0119 -0.0101 -0.0026 0.0603b 0.0639a
(0.0258) (0.0487) (0.0475) (0.0116) (0.0249) (0.0246)
OECD OUTINTit 0.1008a 0.1276a 0.1296a -0.0178b 0.0009 -0.0006
(0.0198) (0.0460) (0.0458) (0.0083) (0.0221) (0.0219)
Other OUTFINit 0.0664 0.1284 0.1596 -0.0457 -0.0744 -0.0804
(0.0543) (0.1005) (0.0988) (0.0313) (0.0518) (0.0518)
Other OUTINTit 0.1083 0.1860 0.1478 0.0331 -0.0849 -0.0535
(0.0979) (0.1817) (0.1777) (0.0382) (0.1301) (0.1256)
BJS OUTFINit -0.0824 0.2898 0.1753 -0.0045 0.0692 0.1147
(0.1679) (0.4980) (0.4786) (0.0441) (0.1589) (0.1536)
BJS OUTINTit -0.0863 -0.4877 -0.4760 -0.0457 -0.2105 -0.2258
(0.1479) (0.4229) (0.4223) (0.0933) (0.2282) (0.2236)
China OUTFINit -0.3111b -0.3050c -0.3182c -0.1079b -0.1684b -0.1739b
(0.1389) (0.1832) (0.1827) (0.0524) (0.0799) (0.0764)
China OUTINTit 0.0529 -0.0629 -0.0750 -0.0732 0.2885c 0.3152b
(0.1982) (0.2399) (0.2354) (0.0719) (0.1564) (0.1530)
Number of endogenous variables 12 8 12 8
Number of instruments 32 24 32 24
Under-identication statistic 180.346 30.995 178.640 31.330
(0.0000) (0.0200) (0.0000) (0.0182)
Weak identication statistic 5.935 1.181 6.613 1.356
Hansen J statistic 57.785 18.620 13.114 10.300
(0.0000) (0.2889) (0.8724) (0.8505)
Firm xed eect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year xed eect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 118,717 112,490 112,742 115,437 108,919 109,114
R-squared 0.1712 0.1660 0.1702 0.0266 0.0213 0.0272
Number of rms 16,835 14,692 14,707 17,296 15,158 15,171
1.FG indicates nished goods, IG indicates intermediate goods
2.Coecients for industry-level trade variables are not reported
3.IV1 use IV's for both rm- and industry-level imports
4.IV2 only use IV's for rm-level imports and treat industry imports as exogenous
5.Firm level imports are measured by imports over turnover
6.Robust standard errors (p-values) in parentheses for coecients (test statistics)
7.abcindicate the signicance of the coecient,a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
33Table 8: Import Competition Analysis. Share of Non-Production Workers: NP/Eit+1
Dep. Variable: NP/Eit+1
Specication (1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation Method FE FE IV IV
Controls
log(K/E)it 0.0016c 0.0016c 0.0015b 0.0016b
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0006)
log(VA/E)it -0.0085a -0.0084a -0.0083a -0.0082a
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0013)
log(E)it 0.0263a 0.0268a 0.0271a 0.0274a
(0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0031) (0.0031)
log(Age)it -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0020) (0.0020)
log(Intang.K/E)it 0.0112a 0.0114a 0.0115a 0.0116a
(0.0039) (0.0040) (0.0027) (0.0027)
Import Competition Variables
OECD IMPSHAREjt -0.0142 -0.0130 -0.0288 -0.0155
(0.0114) (0.0114) (0.1069) (0.0773)
Other IMPSHAREjt -0.0236 -0.0103 -0.0156 -0.0600
(0.0228) (0.0228) (0.1681) (0.1577)
BJS IMPSHAREjt 0.1319c 0.1236c -0.0125 -0.0525
(0.0688) (0.0703) (0.1749) (0.1537)
China IMPSHAREjt 0.0731b 0.1577a 0.2891a 0.3238a
(0.0357) (0.0445) (0.1118) (0.1065)
Medium-low tech.jt -0.2514a -0.3949a
(0.0707) (0.1364)
Medium-high tech.jt -0.3589a -0.6805a
(0.1045) (0.1317)
High tech.jt -0.0477 -0.6550b
(0.1435) (0.2980)
Number of endogenous variables 4 7
Number of instruments 8 14
Under-identication statistic 158.868 206.188
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Weak identication statistic 21.459 15.308
Hansen J statistic 4.436 12.855
(0.3502) (0.0757)
Firm xed eect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year xed eect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 119,316 119,316 117,444 117,444
R-squared 0.0195 0.0201 0.0184 0.0190
Number of rms 16,889 16,889 15,267 15,267
1.Robust standard errors (p-values) in parentheses for coecients (test statistics)
2.abcindicate the signicance of the coecient,a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
3.indicates the signicance of interaction plus the level coecient , p<0.01,
p<0.05,  p<0.1
34Table 9: Import Competition Analysis. Share of Skilled Workers: S/Eit+1
Dep. Variable: S/Eit+1
Specication (1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation Method FE FE IV IV
Controls
log(K/E)it 0.0199 0.0195 0.0187 0.0186
(0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0147) (0.0147)
log(VA/E)it 0.0409 0.0413 0.0449c 0.0452c
(0.0284) (0.0284) (0.0241) (0.0241)
log(E)it 0.2039a 0.2048a 0.2090a 0.2093a
(0.0789) (0.0790) (0.0669) (0.0669)
log(Age)it -0.0461 -0.0457 -0.0561 -0.0527
(0.0494) (0.0495) (0.0357) (0.0351)
log(Intang.K/E)it -0.0142 -0.0137 -0.0123 -0.0123
(0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0119) (0.0120)
Import Competition Variables
OECD IMPSHAREjt -0.0411 -0.0432 -0.3874 -0.1898
(0.0549) (0.0548) (0.3493) (0.2644)
Other IMPSHAREjt -0.1014 -0.1044 -2.2695a -2.3051a
(0.1697) (0.1672) (0.7345) (0.7019)
BJS IMPSHAREjt 0.1998 0.0443 0.6816 0.4830
(0.3338) (0.3443) (0.4918) (0.5125)
China IMPSHAREjt 0.5492 0.8636c 1.8586a 2.0796a
(0.3413) (0.5067) (0.4978) (0.5631)
Medium-low tech.jt -0.0517 0.6849
(0.7464) (1.1999)
Medium-high tech.jt -1.0516b -1.9155a
(0.5347) (0.5485)
High tech.jt -0.8052 0.2824
(0.5413) (1.0544)
Number of endogenous variables 4 7
Number of instruments 8 14
Under-identication statistic 48.547 64.185
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Weak identication statistic 5.755 4.987
Hansen J statistic 12.370 23.490
(0.0148) (0.0014)
Firm xed eect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year xed eect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20,056 20,056 19,935 19,935
R-squared 0.3280 0.3281 0.3188 0.3201
Number of rms 2,560 2,560 2,463 2,463
1.Robust standard errors (p-values) in parentheses for coecients (test statistics)
2.abcindicate the signicance of the coecient,a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
3.indicates the signicance of interaction plus the level coecient , p<0.01,
p<0.05,  p<0.1
35Table 10: Firm-Level Outsourcing Analysis. Share of Non-Production (NP/Eit+1) and Share
of Skilled Workers (S/Eit+1)
Dep. Variable NP/Eit+1 NP/Eit+1 NP/Eit+1 S/Eit+1 S/Eit+1 S/Eit+1
Specication (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimation Method FE IV1 IV2 FE IV1 IV2
Controls (Import Competition Variables not Reported)
log(K/E)it 0.0017c 0.0014b 0.0015b 0.0182 0.0136 0.0149
(0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0174) (0.0145) (0.0144)
log(VA/E)it -0.0102a -0.0108a -0.0111a 0.0456 0.0553b 0.0494b
(0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0293) (0.0250) (0.0247)
log(E)it 0.0259a 0.0272a 0.0267a 0.2014b 0.2015a 0.1967a
(0.0044) (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0788) (0.0673) (0.0671)
log(Age)it -0.0030 -0.0031 -0.0040 -0.0410 -0.0441 -0.0353
(0.0028) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0500) (0.0360) (0.0354)
log(Intang.K/E)it 0.0113a 0.0122a 0.0122a -0.0139 -0.0113 -0.0135
(0.0039) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0127) (0.0122) (0.0119)
Firm-Level Outsourcing Variables
OECD OUTFINit 0.0460a 0.0990a 0.0928a 0.1440 0.3494b 0.2577c
(0.0128) (0.0208) (0.0202) (0.1053) (0.1621) (0.1553)
OECD OUTINTit -0.0018 0.0112 0.0077 0.1266b 0.4094b 0.3940b
(0.0076) (0.0158) (0.0157) (0.0644) (0.1883) (0.1870)
Other OUTFINit 0.0207 0.1053b 0.1106b -0.0906 -0.0802 -0.2264
(0.0298) (0.0493) (0.0493) (0.1141) (0.1830) (0.1835)
Other OUTINTit 0.0770b 0.0043 0.0051 0.1501 -0.0943 0.0675
(0.0318) (0.0741) (0.0737) (0.1278) (0.4419) (0.4143)
BJS OUTFINit 0.0627 0.5238b 0.5581b 0.8007 1.5001 1.7324
(0.0717) (0.2343) (0.2406) (0.6109) (1.0666) (1.3139)
BJS OUTINTit 0.1106 0.0728 0.0926 0.2988 1.6237c 1.4384
(0.0995) (0.1656) (0.1641) (0.3212) (0.8799) (0.8767)
China OUTFINit 0.1074c 0.1658b 0.2029a -0.1443 -0.7165 -0.5608
(0.0553) (0.0693) (0.0688) (0.3911) (0.6576) (0.7116)
China OUTINTit 0.1722b 0.2618b 0.2727b -0.0500 -0.4062 -0.4041
(0.0721) (0.1100) (0.1075) (0.2636) (0.4605) (0.3915)
Number of endogenous variables 12 8 12 8
Number of instruments 32 24 32 24
Under-identication statistic 180.203 30.493 77.875 28.208
(0.0000) (0.0230) (0.0000) (0.0426)
Weak identication statistic 6.086 1.205 2.700 1.182
Hansen J statistic 40.743 35.725 24.555 18.038
(0.0040) (0.0032) (0.2190) (0.3217)
Firm xed eect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year xed eect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 118,629 112,390 112,643 20,036 19,897 19,921
R-squared 0.0204 0.0184 0.0192 0.3296 0.3150 0.3273
Number of rms 16,803 14,652 14,666 2,558 2,461 2,461
1.FG indicates nished goods, IG indicates intermediate goods
2.Coecients for industry-level trade variables are not reported
3.IV1 use IV's for both rm- and industry-level imports
4.IV2 only use IV's for rm-level imports and treat industry imports as exogenous
5.Firm level imports are measured by imports over turnover
6.Robust standard errors (p-values) in parentheses for coecients (test statistics)
7.abcindicate the signicance of the coecient,a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
36Figure 1: Import share of China and other low-wage countries over the period 1996-2007.
Figure 2: Belgian manufacturing employment in full time equivalent (FTE) over the period
1996-2007.
37Figure 3: Share of non-production workers in Belgian manufacturing over the period 1996-
2007.
Figure 4: Share of skilled workers in Belgian manufacturing over the period 1996-2007.
38Figure 5: Share of rms involved in outsourcing of nal goods from China and LW countries
in Belgian manufacturing over the period 1996-2007.
Figure 6: Share of rms involved in outsourcing of intermediate goods from China and LW
countries in Belgian manufacturing over the period 1996-2007.
39Figure 7: Breakdown of NACE industries depending on their technological intensity,
40Appendix: Robustness checks Tables with EU15 import shares
Table 11: Import Competition Analysis. Employment Growth: Eit+1 (Robust EU15 Im-
ports)
Dep. Variable: Eit+1
Specication (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimation Method FE FE FE IV IV IV
Controls
NP/Eit -0.1016a -0.1071a -0.1010a -0.0990a -0.1025a -0.0989a
(0.0141) (0.0150) (0.0141) (0.0136) (0.0158) (0.0136)
log(K/E)it 0.0321a 0.0331a 0.0321a 0.0316a 0.0356a 0.0318a
(0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0025) (0.0020)
log(VA/E)it 0.1001a 0.0984a 0.1000a 0.1002a 0.1010a 0.1002a
(0.0049) (0.0053) (0.0049) (0.0046) (0.0059) (0.0046)
log(E)it -0.2614a -0.2617a -0.2620a -0.2637a -0.2623a -0.2638a
(0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0127) (0.0125) (0.0126)
log(Age)it -0.0180a -0.0172a -0.0180a -0.0178a -0.0175a -0.0177a
(0.0057) (0.0058) (0.0057) (0.0051) (0.0052) (0.0051)
log(Intang.K/E)it 0.0204c 0.0202c 0.0202c 0.0206c 0.0205c 0.0203c
(0.0110) (0.0109) (0.0110) (0.0111) (0.0109) (0.0110)
Import Competition Variables
OECD IMPSHAREjt 0.0797c 0.0787 0.0697 0.8679b 0.2529 0.5932
(0.0480) (0.0480) (0.0483) (0.4335) (0.4387) (0.3878)
Other IMPSHAREjt -0.0442 -0.0446 -0.0588 -0.5000 0.1896 -0.3386
(0.0767) (0.0767) (0.0772) (0.4320) (0.4567) (0.4183)
BJS IMPSHAREjt -0.6803b -0.8002 -0.5710c -2.3836b -1.9124 -1.3861







China IMPSHAREjt -0.4082a -0.3883 -0.5042a -0.2604 -0.5634 -0.4930c







Medium-low tech.jt 0.5757a 0.9332b
(0.2119) (0.4750)
Medium-high tech.jt 0.2909 0.5680c
(0.2048) (0.3027)
High tech.jt 0.2470 -0.3978
(0.2488) (0.5365)
Number of endogenous variables 4 10 7
Number of instruments 8 20 14
Under-identication statistic 361.929 469.684 248.384
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Weak identication statistic 46.402 22.561 19.360
Hansen J statistic 46.495 69.702 44.599
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Firm xed eect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year xed eect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 108,277 108,277 108,277 106,597 106,597 106,597
R-squared 0.1651 0.1652 0.1652 0.1604 0.1642 0.1632
Number of rms 15,123 15,123 15,123 13,717 13,717 13,717
1.Robust standard errors (p-values) in parentheses for coecients (test statistics)
2.abcindicate the signicance of the coecient,a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
3.indicates the signicance of interaction plus the level coecient,  p<0.01,  p<0.05,  p<0.1
41Table 12: Import Competition Analysis. Firm Exit: Deathit+1 (Robust EU15 Imports)
Dep. Variable: Deathit+1
Specication (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimation Method FE FE FE IV IV IV
Controls
NP/Eit -0.0010 -0.0008 -0.0010 -0.0019 -0.0034 -0.0024
(0.0050) (0.0054) (0.0050) (0.0046) (0.0054) (0.0046)
log(K/E)it -0.0039a -0.0021b -0.0039a -0.0037a -0.0016 -0.0037a
(0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0009)
log(VA/E)it -0.0281a -0.0287a -0.0281a -0.0282a -0.0303a -0.0283a
(0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0025) (0.0020)
log(E)it -0.0182a -0.0181a -0.0182a -0.0177a -0.0179a -0.0176a
(0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0043)
log(Age)it 0.0523a 0.0526a 0.0523a 0.0526a 0.0530a 0.0523a
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029)
log(Intang.K/E)it 0.0070 0.0069 0.0069 0.0070c 0.0071c 0.0069c
(0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0039)
Import Competition Variables
OECD IMPSHAREjt 0.0073 0.0063 0.0046 -0.1641 0.0034 -0.4062b
(0.0231) (0.0231) (0.0234) (0.2512) (0.2357) (0.2070)
Other IMPSHAREjt -0.0096 -0.0086 -0.0097 0.2426 0.0271 0.3554
(0.0250) (0.0251) (0.0250) (0.2441) (0.2403) (0.2531)
BJS IMPSHAREjt 0.1363 -0.1134 0.1591 1.0210 -0.3585 1.8134b







China IMPSHAREjt -0.0069 -0.1110 -0.0206 -0.1334 0.1341 -0.3173c







Medium-low tech.jt -0.2050c -0.1309
(0.1091) (0.2178)
Medium-high tech.jt 0.0810 0.4164b
(0.1050) (0.2070)
High tech.jt 0.1579 0.6886b
(0.1242) (0.3171)
Number of endogenous variables 4 10 7
Number of instruments 8 20 14
Under-identication statistic 185.995 271.800 174.608
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Weak identication statistic 26.614 15.186 13.393
Hansen J statistic 13.991 35.103 13.548
(0.0073) (0.0001) (0.0598)
Firm xed eect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year xed eect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 105,206 105,206 105,206 103,743 103,743 103,743
R-squared 0.0261 0.0265 0.0262 0.0238 0.0253 0.0184
Number of rms 15,509 15,509 15,509 14,263 14,263 14,263
1.Robust standard errors (p-values) in parentheses for coecients (test statistics)
2.abcindicate the signicance of the coecient,a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
3.indicates the signicance of interaction plus the level coecient,  p<0.01,  p<0.05,  p<0.1
42Table 13: Firm-Level Outsourcing Analysis. Employment Growth (Eit+1) and Firm Exit
(Deathit+1): Robust EU15 Imports
Dep. Variable Eit+1 Eit+1 Eit+1 Deathit+1 Deathit+1 Deathit+1
Specication (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimation Method FE IV1 IV2 FE IV1 IV2
Controls (Import Competition Variables not Reported)
NP/Eit -0.0991a -0.0961a -0.0988a -0.0011 -0.0046 -0.0039
(0.0141) (0.0140) (0.0139) (0.0050) (0.0046) (0.0045)
log(K/E)it 0.0314a 0.0303a 0.0307a -0.0036a -0.0033a -0.0034a
(0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0009)
log(VA/E)it 0.1068a 0.1144a 0.1143a -0.0312a -0.0361a -0.0360a
(0.0053) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0023)
log(E)it -0.2647a -0.2776a -0.2759a -0.0185a -0.0223a -0.0225a
(0.0125) (0.0108) (0.0106) (0.0047) (0.0042) (0.0042)
log(Age)it -0.0142b 0.0095 0.0085 0.0496a 0.0482a 0.0481a
(0.0059) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0032) (0.0034) (0.0034)
log(Intang.K/E)it 0.0192c 0.0071 0.0065 0.0069 0.0045 0.0046
(0.0109) (0.0086) (0.0084) (0.0043) (0.0038) (0.0038)
Firm-Level Outsourcing Variables
OECD OUTFINit 0.0140 -0.0144 -0.0012 -0.0032 0.0570b 0.0578b
(0.0256) (0.0506) (0.0478) (0.0117) (0.0276) (0.0246)
OECD OUTINTit 0.0991a 0.1372a 0.1360a -0.0179b -0.0024 -0.0027
(0.0199) (0.0479) (0.0464) (0.0085) (0.0236) (0.0222)
Other OUTFINit 0.0702 0.1791c 0.1625 -0.0438 -0.0805 -0.0790
(0.0548) (0.0994) (0.0994) (0.0316) (0.0521) (0.0520)
Other OUTINTit 0.1170 0.1720 0.1748 0.0346 -0.0338 -0.0467
(0.1010) (0.1833) (0.1829) (0.0396) (0.1307) (0.1297)
BJS OUTFINit -0.0822 0.1620 0.1316 -0.0053 0.1363 0.1151
(0.1683) (0.4635) (0.4718) (0.0446) (0.1586) (0.1535)
BJS OUTINTit -0.0713 -0.4605 -0.4490 -0.0452 -0.2625 -0.2325
(0.1470) (0.4220) (0.4223) (0.0934) (0.2236) (0.2242)
China OUTFINit -0.3160b -0.3022c -0.3188c -0.1091b -0.1746b -0.1741b
(0.1345) (0.1815) (0.1816) (0.0522) (0.0777) (0.0757)
China OUTINTit 0.0694 -0.0603 -0.0409 -0.0781 0.2978b 0.2882c
(0.2027) (0.2453) (0.2443) (0.0738) (0.1502) (0.1497)
Number of endogenous variables 12 8 12 8
Number of instruments 32 24 32 24
Under-identication statistic 443.504 30.742 242.704 31.478
(0.0000) (0.0215) (0.0000) (0.0175)
Weak identication statistic 17.830 1.182 11.129 1.363
Hansen J statistic 57.689 16.523 18.507 10.233
(0.0000) (0.4171) (0.5541) (0.8542)
Firm xed eect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year xed eect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 107,684 102,370 102,651 104,595 99,085 99,308
R-squared 0.1679 0.1631 0.1668 0.0267 0.0264 0.0272
Number of rms 15,050 13,222 13,239 15,447 13,661 13,676
1.FG indicates nished goods, IG indicates intermediate goods
2.Coecients for industry-level trade variables are not reported
3.IV1 use IV's for both rm- and industry-level imports
4.IV2 only use IV's for rm-level imports and treat industry imports as exogenous
5.Firm level imports are measured by imports over turnover
6.Robust standard errors (p-values) in parentheses for coecients (test statistics)
7.abcindicate the signicance of the coecient,a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
43Table 14: Import Competition Analysis. Share of Non-Production Workers: NP/Eit+1 (Ro-
bust EU15 Imports)
Dep. Variable: NP/Eit+1
Specication (1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation Method FE FE IV IV
Controls
log(K/E)it 0.0020b 0.0020b 0.0021a 0.0020a
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0007)
log(VA/E)it -0.0060a -0.0059a -0.0059a -0.0058a
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0013)
log(E)it 0.0253a 0.0259a 0.0265a 0.0268a
(0.0044) (0.0045) (0.0031) (0.0031)
log(Age)it -0.0030 -0.0029 -0.0024 -0.0024
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0020) (0.0020)
log(Intang.K/E)it 0.0118a 0.0121a 0.0120a 0.0124a
(0.0039) (0.0040) (0.0028) (0.0027)
Import Competition Variables
OECD IMPSHAREjt -0.0403b -0.0295c -0.5015a -0.2369
(0.0174) (0.0175) (0.1866) (0.1580)
Other IMPSHAREjt 0.0269 0.0401c 0.6155a 0.4597b
(0.0226) (0.0230) (0.1945) (0.1785)
BJS IMPSHAREjt 0.2114c 0.1132 0.8957b -0.0124
(0.1221) (0.1264) (0.4008) (0.4402)
China IMPSHAREjt 0.1026b 0.1854a 0.1751c 0.3818a
(0.0477) (0.0560) (0.1020) (0.1129)
Medium-low tech.jt -0.3244a -0.6451a
(0.1132) (0.1614)
Medium-high tech.jt -0.4286a -0.7210a
(0.1215) (0.1368)
High tech.jt -0.1581 -0.3618
(0.1438) (0.2257)
Number of endogenous variables 4 7
Number of instruments 8 14
Under-identication statistic 339.737 242.889
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Weak identication statistic 45.080 19.009
Hansen J statistic 17.365 13.431
(0.0016) (0.0623)
Firm xed eect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year xed eect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 108,217 108,217 106,536 106,536
R-squared 0.0172 0.0178 0.0002 0.0118
Number of rms 15,101 15,101 13,697 13,697
1.Robust standard errors (p-values) in parentheses for coecients (test statistics)
2.abcindicate the signicance of the coecient,a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
3.indicates the signicance of interaction plus the level coecient , p<0.01,
p<0.05,  p<0.1
44Table 15: Import Competition Analysis. Share of Skilled Workers: S/Eit+1 (Robust EU15
Imports)
Dep. Variable: S/Eit+1
Specication (1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation Method FE FE IV IV
Controls
log(K/E)it 0.0216 0.0213 0.0199 0.0199
(0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0152) (0.0152)
log(VA/E)it 0.0400 0.0401 0.0409c 0.0397c
(0.0288) (0.0288) (0.0240) (0.0239)
log(E)it 0.2045b 0.2057b 0.2070a 0.2069a
(0.0802) (0.0802) (0.0682) (0.0680)
log(Age)it -0.0460 -0.0448 -0.0548 -0.0493
(0.0503) (0.0503) (0.0357) (0.0353)
log(Intang.K/E)it -0.0148 -0.0141 -0.0138 -0.0136
(0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0125) (0.0124)
Import Competition Variables
OECD IMPSHAREjt 0.0087 0.0198 -0.4520 -0.4840
(0.0673) (0.0683) (0.7754) (0.6540)
Other IMPSHAREjt -0.0075 0.0070 -0.7593 -0.1927
(0.0938) (0.0931) (1.1224) (1.0348)
BJS IMPSHAREjt 0.5608 0.4041 3.0185 1.5828
(0.5676) (0.6155) (2.2692) (2.1392)
China IMPSHAREjt 0.5951c 0.9952c 0.6074 1.1318c
(0.3165) (0.5407) (0.5813) (0.5879)
Medium-low tech.jt -0.3621 -2.2835
(0.6015) (2.6313)
Medium-high tech.jt -1.0753c -1.3977b
(0.5562) (0.6107)
High tech.jt -0.6178 0.7927
(0.5601) (0.6934)
Number of endogenous variables 4 7
Number of instruments 8 14
Under-identication statistic 180.321 209.659
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Weak identication statistic 23.524 18.840
Hansen J statistic 9.185 10.193
(0.0566) (0.1779)
Firm xed eect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year xed eect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19,602 19,602 19,454 19,454
R-squared 0.3287 0.3289 0.3242 0.3261
Number of rms 2,505 2,505 2,406 2,406
1.Robust standard errors (p-values) in parentheses for coecients (test statistics)
2.abcindicate the signicance of the coecient,a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
3.indicates the signicance of interaction plus the level coecient , p<0.01,
p<0.05,  p<0.1
45Table 16: Firm-Level Outsourcing Analysis. Share of Non-Production (NP/Eit+1) and Share
of Skilled Workers (S/Eit+1): Robust EU15 Imports
Dep. Variable NP/Eit+1 NP/Eit+1 NP/Eit+1 S/Eit+1 S/Eit+1 S/Eit+1
Specication (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimation Method FE IV1 IV2 FE IV1 IV2
Controls (Import Competition Variables not Reported)
log(K/E)it 0.0021b 0.0019a 0.0018a 0.0199 0.0154 0.0164
(0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0182) (0.0151) (0.0150)
log(VA/E)it -0.0072a -0.0074a -0.0078a 0.0447 0.0486c 0.0487c
(0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0296) (0.0249) (0.0249)
log(E)it 0.0251a 0.0265a 0.0256a 0.2019b 0.2003a 0.1967a
(0.0044) (0.0033) (0.0031) (0.0800) (0.0689) (0.0683)
log(Age)it -0.0050c -0.0043c -0.0052b -0.0404 -0.0465 -0.0341
(0.0030) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0509) (0.0370) (0.0361)
log(Intang.K/E)it 0.0119a 0.0127a 0.0127a -0.0145 -0.0130 -0.0143
(0.0039) (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0129) (0.0125) (0.0121)
Firm-Level Outsourcing Variables
OECD OUTFINit 0.0472a 0.0937a 0.0960a 0.1352 0.3584b 0.2514
(0.0129) (0.0215) (0.0204) (0.1077) (0.1745) (0.1588)
OECD OUTINTit -0.0010 0.0233 0.0141 0.1326b 0.3162c 0.4196b
(0.0076) (0.0168) (0.0157) (0.0666) (0.1897) (0.1956)
Other OUTFINit 0.0171 0.0887c 0.1085b -0.0905 -0.2869 -0.2371
(0.0299) (0.0497) (0.0495) (0.1155) (0.2024) (0.1862)
Other OUTINTit 0.0741b 0.0011 -0.0034 0.1331 -0.0076 0.0503
(0.0324) (0.0720) (0.0749) (0.1361) (0.4589) (0.4558)
BJS OUTFINit 0.0657 0.5211b 0.5762b 0.8196 1.5988 1.7165
(0.0725) (0.2359) (0.2438) (0.6256) (1.2021) (1.3042)
BJS OUTINTit 0.1052 0.0908 0.0846 0.2289 1.0330 1.3026
(0.0982) (0.1624) (0.1634) (0.3091) (0.8483) (0.8750)
China OUTFINit 0.1135b 0.1893a 0.2137a -0.1392 -0.5321 -0.5248
(0.0560) (0.0691) (0.0697) (0.3943) (0.6640) (0.7099)
China OUTINTit 0.1793b 0.3259a 0.3094a -0.0183 -0.1494 -0.2077
(0.0728) (0.1090) (0.1067) (0.2994) (0.5057) (0.5063)
Number of endogenous variables 12 8 12 8
Number of instruments 32 24 32 24
Under-identication statistic 419.407 30.584 171.866 28.319
(0.0000) (0.0224) (0.0000) (0.0413)
Weak identication statistic 12.805 1.215 6.098 1.175
Hansen J statistic 56.815 36.786 25.862 18.092
(0.0000) (0.0022) (0.1704) (0.3185)
Firm xed eect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year xed eect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 107,619 102,295 102,577 19,583 19,418 19,469
R-squared 0.0182 0.0014 0.0164 0.3304 0.3219 0.3279
Number of rms 15,022 13,193 13,209 2,503 2,404 2,406
1.FG indicates nished goods, IG indicates intermediate goods
2.Coecients for industry-level trade variables are not reported
3.IV1 use IV's for both rm- and industry-level imports
4.IV2 only use IV's for rm-level imports and treat industry imports as exogenous
5.Firm level imports are measured by imports over turnover
6.Robust standard errors (p-values) in parentheses for coecients (test statistics)
7.abcindicate the signicance of the coecient,a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
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